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Guide · Published November 14, 2026 · Reviewed November 14, 2026 · Ingenious AI team · Not legal advice

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How to Keep ADMT Records for Three Years: What Goes in the File and Why the Chain Matters

The short answer: Colorado's SB 26-189 requires deployers and developers to retain records that show compliance for a minimum of three years. The ADMT Notice Kit's design decision is to keep one record for all states — Colorado, California, and Connecticut — held for three years, containing per decision: the pre-use notice, the decision and its date, the principal reasons and data summary, the explanation and its sent date, and every follow-on event — opt-outs, access answers, corrections, re-runs, and reviews — in a SHA-256 hash-chained sequence that shows if any entry was altered after the fact.

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What is the ADMT record? It is the per-decision evidence file for the notice duties: what was said, to whom, when, and what happened next. California's kit duty says the same thing in its own words — keep records of notices and responses — and Connecticut's says keep notice and opt-out records with the decision record. One record, three states' phrasings, a single retention period: three years.

The per-decision file: six things, always together

A complete decision file holds: (1) the pre-use notice as given, with its date; (2) the decision — type, state, date, outcome; (3) the principal reasons and the data summary, captured at decision time; (4) the explanation, with its sent date, where the outcome was adverse; (5) every request the person made (opt-out, access, correction, review) with receipt dates; (6) every response and outcome, with dates — including re-runs and their results. Missing any one breaks a question the file exists to answer.

Test your current record the way the guides keep suggesting: pick a decision from two months ago and produce all six within the hour. The gaps the test reveals are almost never about storage — they are about fields nobody captured: the decision date in one system, the sent date in an outbox, the reasons in the tool's dashboard with a 30-day data expiry. Capture design, not archive size, is the real project. The capture points map onto the system inventory: every tool in the register should name where its six items live.

Why a hash chain, in plain terms

The kit links record entries with SHA-256 hashes: each entry's fingerprint incorporates the previous entry's, so altering an earlier entry breaks every fingerprint after it. The practical meaning: the record can show it has not been quietly edited. Dates can be checked against the sequence; a backdated explanation inserted months later does not fit the chain. For a record whose entire value is credibility — it exists to be believed later, by a regulator, a reviewer, or the business itself — tamper-evidence is not a luxury feature.

Hash-chaining does not make entries true; it makes them unchangeable without detection. Truth still comes from capture discipline: the notice logged when it was given, the sent date logged when sending happened. A chain around late, reconstructed entries proves only that the reconstruction has not changed since. The technology and the discipline are complements, which is why the kit pairs chained storage with per-person generation at the moment of the event. The chain concept is explored further in Hash-Chained Decision Records.

Worked example: Ozark Ridge Health Staffing

Example — fictional business, real duty structure. Ozark Ridge is a fictional staffing firm placing healthcare workers across Colorado, California, and Connecticut. It rebuilt its record-keeping around the six-item decision file:

Retention: three years from what, and what happens at the end

Colorado's floor is at least 3 years for compliance records. The kit holds its single all-state record for three years on that basis. Prudent practice ties the period to the decision: a decision made in March 2027 is retained until at least March 2030, with its whole chain — notices, explanations, corrections, re-runs, reviews — kept together, because a partial chain answers partial questions.

Exports are part of retention, not an extra: the record must be producible, in readable form, when it is needed — which is why the kit builds export into the workflow rather than treating the database as the record. Test the export the way you test the file: export one case, read it cold, and check a stranger could follow what was said and when. Retention that cannot be read is storage, not a record. The export workflow is covered in How to Export Your ADMT Decision Record.

One record for three states: how the divergence is stored

The states disagree about clocks and contents — Colorado's 30 days, California's no-fixed-clock, Connecticut's 45-day opt-out answers — so the record stores the state with every decision and derives the duty view from it. Colorado cases show days remaining; California cases show their opt-outs and access answers without an invented deadline; Connecticut cases carry the notice pair and profiling events. Divergence becomes data, not three filing cabinets.

This is also the honest answer to 'can't we just keep everything everywhere to be safe?': keeping everything is exactly what the single record does — the discipline is in the per-state views, which prevent the opposite error of applying one state's clock to another state's case. Why that error matters is shown concretely in ADMT Notices for Insurance Decisions, where the states do not even agree on coverage.

Access, ownership, and the deployer duty

One more principle from Colorado's data: the duty sits with the deployer — the business using the tool — not the vendor that sold it. The record should therefore live where the deployer controls it, exportable without the tool vendor's cooperation. A record locked inside a screening tool you might replace is a retention risk measured in vendor decisions, not years.

Access inside the business needs the same deliberateness: the record contains personal data and decision reasoning, so role-based access (reviewers see their queue, auditors see exports, nobody sees everything by default) is part of record-keeping, not an IT afterthought. The kit's account and team structure exists for this: seats for the people doing the work, exports for the people checking it. Set it up from the plans page and generate the first entries from the free notice generator.

  1. Define the six-item decision file (notice, decision, reasons + data summary, explanation, requests, responses) and capture all six per decision
  2. Run the one-hour test on a two-month-old case and fix the fields it exposes as missing
  3. Keep entries in a tamper-evident sequence — the kit uses a SHA-256 hash chain — and verify it on a schedule
  4. Tie the 3-year retention to each decision's date, keep the whole chain together, and test exports by reading one cold
  5. Hold the record under the deployer's own control, exportable without the tool vendor, with role-based access

Sources, as carried in the kit's own data: the duty summaries in app/rules.py and the checker data in app/checker_data.py, verified against primary or authoritative sources on October 28, 2026. Run the free duties checker for your jurisdiction, decision type, and the tool's role, and compare the kit's plans for the record, builder, and review queue. More from Ingenious AI is on the hub.

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Related guides

See all ADMT guides for the full set.

Frequently asked questions

How long must ADMT records be kept?

Colorado requires compliance records for at least 3 years. The kit keeps one record for all states — notices, explanations, opt-outs, and reviews — held for three years.

What belongs in each decision's record?

The pre-use notice with its date, the decision (type, state, date, outcome), the principal reasons and data summary, the explanation with its sent date where adverse, and every request and response — opt-outs, access answers, corrections, re-runs, reviews — with dates.

What is a hash-chained record?

Entries linked by SHA-256 fingerprints, each incorporating the previous entry's hash, so altering an earlier entry breaks the sequence detectably. It makes the record tamper-evident; it does not by itself make entries true — that comes from capturing them at the time.

Do California and Connecticut have record duties too?

Yes, in their own words: California — keep records of notices and responses; Connecticut — keep notice and opt-out records with the decision record. The kit's single record satisfies the shared shape.

Whose record is it — ours or our tool vendor's?

Yours. Colorado's data is explicit that the duty sits with the deployer, not the vendor. Keep the record under your control and exportable without the vendor.

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